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STRIVING FOR PERFECTION:
THE REFORM PROPOSALS FOR
COPYRIGHT-SECURED FINANCING
I. INTRODUCTION
When making a loan, it is of paramount importance for a lender to
perfect' its security intereste in the property used as collateral.3 As part
of the process for perfection, the lender records its security interest in
the appropriate office. Recordation then gives rise to constructive no-
tice indicating that the collateral is already encumbered, and thus pri-
oritizes the security interests as they pertain to that particular collateral.
So, in the event of a bankruptcy, or when the borrower defaults on the
loan, perfection secures the lender against third parties, and allows the
lender to use the proceeds from the sale of the collateral to satisfy the
debt.4
In the imperfect world of intellectual property secured financing,
the current law makes it very difficult for a lender to perfect its security
interest in intellectual property. When the collateral is a copyright, the
lender meets considerable hurdles. To perfect its security interest, the
lender must ensure that the copyright has been registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office and then record its security interest there. This
1. "Perfection" is the "[v]alidation of a security interest as against other
creditors, usu[ally] by filing a statement with some public office or by taking
possession of the collateral." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (7th ed. 1999)
[hereinafter BLACK'S].
2. A "security interest" is "an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1999).
3. "Collateral" is "[p]roperty that is pledged as security against a debt; the
property subject to a security interest." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 255. Ac-
cording to the Uniform Commercial Code, "collaterar' is "the property subject
to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) (1999).
4. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property
and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1647-48 & n.9
(1996).
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Comment describes why such a two-step process is problematic and
accordingly suggests a solution based in federal law.
When borrowing money, the borrower wants to obtain the highest
premium and the most favorable loan terms. One way it can do this is
by pledging a valuable asset as collateral--for example, a copyright,
patent, or trademark.5 In fact, borrowers often pledge many forms of
property in one collateral package to secure a loan. But risks, whether
they involve the valuation of that collateral package or the process for
perfecting a security interest, increase the costs associated with such
secured transactions.6 Thus, by minimizing the risks associated with
the transaction, the borrower can maximize the funds borrowed.
A brief discussion of the risks will illuminate some of the issues
borrowers and lenders face. In intellectual property secured financing,
one type of risk involves the inherent nature of the collateral. More
than real property, intellectual property tends to gain and lose value
very quickly.7 For that reason, valuing intellectual property is often
more challenging than valuing other kinds of real or personal property.
5. This Comment focuses on copyrights used as collateral in secured
transactions. Patents, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property de-
serve separate analyses due to their inherent differences. Often, however, dif-
ferent types of property form a single collateral package. In other words, a
loan is often secured not only with a copyright, but also with other forms of
property, such as accounts receivable, equipment, real property, and trade-
marks, all of which together secure the loan.
As of this writing, the Franklin Pierce Law Center, in a joint effort with
the University of Maine School of Law and the University of New Hampshire
Whittemore School of Business & Economics, has embarked upon a study
commissioned by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to assess the feasibil-
ity of a centralized intellectual property registry. Ultimately, such a registry
would be the only place to search for security interests in all federal intellectual
property. See Electronic Message from Thomas M. Ward, Professor, University
of Maine (Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review);
Electronic Message from William J. Murphy, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law
Center (Nov. 24, 1999) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
For a review of the methods for perfection of security interests in copyrights,
patents, and trademarks, see Shawn K. Baldwin, Comment, "To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts ": A Role for Federal Regulation of Intel-
lectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1707-16 (1995).
6. See Patrick R. Barry, Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral: Evalu-
ating the Reform Proposals, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 581, 583-84 (1995).
7. The high rate of change in the computer industry is one example of how
intellectual property tends to gain and lose value very quickly.
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Accurate valuation is important, however, because if a lender cannot
ascertain the value of the property, it might either withdraw from the
transaction or loan much less than what the borrower believes is justi-
fied.'
Another type of risk relates to the secured transaction itself, hav-
ing to do with recordation, indexing, and searching. These risks may
also cause a lender to decline to make the loan or significantly reduce
the borrower's negotiating power. To reduce these risks, the process
for perfecting a security interest must be certain and predictable.9 The
lender should face no more than de minimis risks; if the borrower de-
faults on a loan, the lender should be able to sell the copyright used as
collateral and apply the proceeds against the borrower's obligation.'°
Because intellectual property is such a valuable commodity," it is
critical that Congress' 2 settle the law governing this kind of secured
8. See Peter L. Choate, Comment, Belts, Suspenders, and the Perfection of
Security Interests in Copyrights: The Undressing of the Contemporary Credi-
tor, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1415, 1415 nn.2-4 (1998) (citing William A. Dorn-
bos, Structuring, Financing, and Preserving Security Interests in Intellectual
Property, 113 BANKING L.J. 656, 656 (1996); Aimee A. Watterberg, Com-
ment, Perfecting a Security Interest in Computer Software Copyrights: Getting
it Right, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 855, 855 (1997); Barry, su-
pra note 6, at 583-84.
9. See Barry, supra note 6, at 583-84.
10. "Proceeds" are "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collec-
tion or other disposition of collateral." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1999).
11. Intellectual property is ubiquitous, touching everything-from genetic
coding to supermarket scanners, from the Internet to the movies, from brand
names to commercial processes. In terms of the commodification of intellec-
tual property, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, for instance, has
continually supported patent holders, making patents an increasingly valuable
and stable commodity. See Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1705-06. For a discus-
sion of intellectual property in the global market, see Lorin Brennan, Interna-
tional Copyright Conflicts, 17 WHITTIER L. REv. 203 (1995). See also Wat-
terberg, supra note 8, at 855 n.1 (discussing "internationalization via
multinational trade agreements").
12. Legislation by Congress, and not by individual state legislatures, is re-
quired for the uniform protection of borrowers and lenders. See infra note 178
and accompanying text; Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1732-33 & n.150; Watter-
berg, supra note 8, at 871. It may be argued that Congress can just as easily
pass a law making clear that state law governs the process for perfecting secu-
rity interests in copyrights; however, given the federal policies behind the
copyright laws, the Copyright Act should control perfection. See infra notes
182-84 and accompanying text Explicit congressional enactment is also
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financing. There is much at stake. For instance, in 1999, the Copyright
Office registered 594,501 copyrights.' 3 Of those, 283,187 registrations
were for literary works, encompassing computer software and Internet-
related copyrights. 14
The value of other forms of intellectual property has also in-
creased. In 1999, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued
169,154 patents worldwide.' 5 This represents an increase of 3.6% over
the level in 1998 for the United States and 5.8% for California.'
6
In addition to the increased worth of intellectual property, many
companies experiencing significant growth, especially start-up soft-
ware companies, have an enormous need for capital. Although these
new, closely-held companies often enjoy the support of venture capi-
talists, that support sometimes comes with a cost. In exchange for the
venture capital, some investors expect an ownership interest in the
company. Since some young companies may not wish to divest them-
selves of any ownership interest, they may instead choose to raise
money through other means, such as financing. If intellectual property
secured financing is a realistic possibility, a young company may then
be able to raise capital on its own terms, even if its only valuable assets
are intellectual property, as is often the case.'
7
Even if a company relies on venture capital backing, it may still
want to use debt in its capital structure for a number of reasons-for
instance, to deduct interest payments for tax purposes or to increase the
value of its equity by using leverage. In some cases, the equity market
may be unavailable for a company, especially a non-Internet company,
until it turns a profit. In short, there are a number of reasons why it
needed to convey to lenders and borrowers alike that this kind of borrowing is
reliable.
13. Telephone interview with Cindy Romanyk, Senior Copyright Informa-
tion Specialist, U.S. Copyright Office (Feb. 29, 1999).
14. See id.
15. See Chris Ford, California Tops U.S. in Patents, Los ANGELEs DAILY
J., Mar. 3, 2000, at 3.
16. See id. California, which received 18,865 patents in 1999, was ex-
ceeded by only one foreign nation--Japan--which received 32,515 patents.
See id.
17. Since software development often occurs "from individual effort with
only minimal capital input," a young firm in the software industry usually has
intellectual property as its only valuable asset. Barry, supra note 6, at 584.
The firm's other property, such as its equipment and fixtures, is usually of little
value. See id. at 584-85.
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may be advantageous for a company to borrow against its intellectual
property.
Currently, there is an "uncertain nexus" between federal intellec-
tual property law and state commercial law. 18 Partly due to the land-
mark case National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n,' 9 which in 1990 proscribed the two-step process for perfection,
this uncertainty has manifested itself in the law governing intellectual
property secured financing. This clash, however, extends beyond the
theoretical issues of federal preemption to other practical considera-
tions. 20 Many intellectual property and finance attorneys often are not
sufficiently familiar with each others' practices. 2' As intellectual prop-
erty continues to pervade every aspect of business, corporate and fi-
nance lawyers must learn the complex issues involving intellectual
property to adequately advise their clients, issues which normally are
reserved for intellectual property specialists.
22
This Comment will present, in Part II, the recent history of copy-
right-secured financing, discussing the relevant federal and state stat-
utes and case law. Part III will discuss the current reform proposals:
the Federal Intellectual Property Security Act proposed by two sub-
committees of the American Bar Association (ABA),23 the Proposed
18. Id. at585.
19. 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
20. See John P. Fry & Robert L. Lee, Recovering from Bad Loans: Finding
Security in a Borrower's Intellectual Property, LEGAL TIMEs, May 10, 1999,
at S30 (discussing the benefits of foreclosing instead of litigating or taking
other steps, for the intellectual property to exchange hands from the borrower
to the lender in the event the borrower defaults).
21. Fry and Lee also state that:
most of the firm's intellectual property attorneys, and corporate attor-
neys whose practice involves security agreements where the collateral
is some form of intellectual property, never considered how to fore-
close on the intellectual property in the event of a default Addition-
ally, the attorneys who had experience with foreclosures on real prop-
erty and tangible personal property were in large part also unfamiliar
with the issues that might arise when the collateral is intangible per-
sonal property, such as a patent
Id.
22. See Haenmerli, supra note 4, at 1649.
23. See Intellectual Property Security Registration: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (joint statement of G.
Larry Engel, Business Law Section of the ABA, and Susan Barbieri Montgom-
ArXpril 2000] 1209
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1205
Copyright Filing Modernization Act advanced by the American Film
Marketing Institute,2 4 and the interim measure proposed by the Com-
mercial Finance Association. The discussion of each proposal will
include a description of the proposal along with criticism, as each pro-
posal is bound to pose different problems for borrowers, lenders, third
parties-such as purchasers and licensees--and their respective advo-
cates.
Part IV will then present suggestions based on a purely federal
system for perfecting security interests in copyrights, similar to the
Proposed Copyright Filing Modernization Act advanced by the
American Film Marketing Institute. Part V will provide a hypotheti-
cal of how a lender would perfect its security interest in Internet-
based copyrights under the proposed regime. Finally, this Comment
will conclude that a purely federal system most effectively addresses
the problems faced by borrowers and lenders when attempting to per-
fect security interests in copyrights.
II. BACKGROUND: A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS
A. Conflicting Federal and State Laws
Primarily a creature of federal law, intellectual property presents
unique issues when embedded within the context of state commercial
law.26 For copyrights, the question is whether, and to what extent,
ery, Intellectual Property Law Section of the ABA), available in
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/mont0624.htm> (visited Jan. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Engel & Montgomery, Hearings] (containing the Federal Intel-
lectual Property Security Act).
24. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Lorin Brennan,
Special Counsel, American Film Marketing Institute), available in
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/bren0624.htm> (visited Jan. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Brennan, Hearings] (containing the Proposed Copyright Filing
Modernization Act).
25. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Charles G. Johnson, Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer, Allstate Financial Corporation, on behalf of
the Commercial Finance Association), available in <http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/john0624.htm> (visited Jan. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Johnson, Hear-
ings] (referring to and describing the interim measure).
26. For a fuller discussion of federal preemption, see generally Haemmerli,
supra note 4, at 1653-57 (discussing the contours of federalism); Marci Levine
Klumb, Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Federal
Statutes Preempt Article 9, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135 (1988) (discussing
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federal law27 preempts state commercial law28 under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
29
As a starting premise, the federal government does not exercise
exclusive authority over intellectual property regulation.30 For secured
financing, the issue of where to file a security interest instead arises
from the interplay between sections 9-104(a) and 9-106 of the UCC.3'
The official comment to UCC section 9-106 identifies copyrights-
along with patents and trademarks-as an example of "general
intangibles . . . except to the extent that they may be excluded by
[s]ection 9-104(a). '' 32 Thus, since the Copyright Act is "a statute of the
United States, [which] governs the rights of parties to and third parties
affected by transactions in" copyrights,33 UCC section 9-104(a) seems
to suggest that the intent and scope of federal law preempts the UCC
with respect to copyrights.
34
preemption); Amelia H. Boss & Stephen Veltri, Introduction to the Uniform
Commercial Code Survey: A Plea for Cooperation, 48 Bus. LAW. 1583 (1993)
(presenting generally the tension between federal law and the UCC).
27. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999).
28. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-507 (1999) (regulating secured transactions
and the sales of accounts and chattel paper).
29. See Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (citing U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 and quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824)) ("[S]tate laws are invalid if they 'interfere with, or
are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
[C]onstitution."').
30. See Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1660-68 (concluding that federal copy-
right law does not so completely occupy the field as to preclude state law).
31. The UCC was first developed in the 1940s by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, and
it continues to evolve. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTs 20-22 (3d ed. 1990). Article 9 was enacted as a reform of com-
mercial law in the specific context of secured transactions and sales of ac-
counts and chattel paper. See id. All 50 states have adopted the UCC. See id.
32. U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt.
33. Section 9-104(a) provides that Article 9 does not apply "to a security
interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such stat-
ute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in
particular types of property." U.C.C. § 9-104(a).
34. For a brief discussion of the historic problems with interpreting the
Copyright Act, see Mark F. Radcliffe & Nels R. Nelsen, Code to Code: Per-
fecting Security Interests in Copyrights: The Confusion Continues, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., available in 1997 ABI JNL. LEXIS 236, at *1-9. See also
Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1660-64 (suggesting historic reasons for why the
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Moreover, UCC section 9-302(3)(a) states that a UCC filing "is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property sub-
ject to... a statute or treaty of the United States [that] provides for a
national or international registration... or which specifies a place of
filing different from that specified in... Article [9] for filing of the se-
curity interest."35 In fact, "[t]he Official Code Comment to this section
lists the Copyright Act as just such a statute and states that when 'an
adequate system of filing, state or federal, has been set up outside...
Article [9] ... perfection of a relevant security interest can be had only
through compliance with that system.'
3 6
Thus, it seems that the drafters of the UCC intended for the Copy-
right Act, not the UCC, to govern perfection. The official comment to
UCC section 9-104(a), however, may contradict this view:
Although the Federal Copyright Act contains provi-
sions permitting the mortgage of a copyright and for the re-
cording of an assignment of a copyright.., such a statute
would not seem to contain sufficient provisions regulating
the rights of the parties and third parties to exclude security
interests in copyrights from the provisions of. . . Article
[9]. 37
To further complicate matters, the Copyright Act defines a transfer
of copyright ownership as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license,
or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation. 0 8  Besides
UCC is better equipped than federal law to govern security interests).
35. U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a).
36. Barry, supra note 6, at 586-87 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-302(1)); see also
Choate, supra note 8, at 1424-29 (discussing federal preemption of the UCC).
37. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 1.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101. At issue here is whether the federal law only recog-
nizes transfers of interests, i.e., title and title transfer, or whether it also recog-
nizes security interests, such as liens. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1999) (defining
security interest without making a distinction between security interests as
liens and as title transfers); U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) (1999) (stating that Article 9
applies to any transaction intended to create a security interest). However,
§ 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act states that "[t]he ownership of a copyright
may be transferred in whole or in part." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1). As previously
stated, § 101 states that a transfer may be "an assignment; mortgage, exclusive
license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 101. Furthermore, according to Peregrine, mortgages and hy-
pothecations "include a pledge of property as security or collateral for a debt."
Choate, supra note 8, at 1420 (citing National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed.
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mortgages and hypothecations, however, the Copyright Act makes no
further reference to security interests in copyrights. Consequently, for
the Copyright Act to effectively and fully govern the area of copyright-
secured financing, it should have rules that explicitly deal with the
creation and perfection of security interests, in addition to rules gov-
erning priority, after-acquired property, and floating liens, areas with
which the UCC already deals.
39
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit discusses federal preemption
of copyright law in dictum. Cybernetic Services, Inc. v. Matsco, Inc.
40
dealt with whether the federal Patent Act preempts the UCC when the
collateral at issue is a patent.41 The court pointed to the "limited focus
and skeletal nature of the Patent Act and its lack of reference to the
creation and perfection of security interests" and held that the UCC
was not preempted with respect to patents.42 In comparison, the court
cited 'three specific federal statutes that provide a filing system ade-
quate to supersede the Article [9] filing system for perfection of secu-
rity interests." 43
The court cited the Copyright Act as one such federal statute,
which defines ownership to include transfers of security interests, 44 sets
forth a priority scheme for conflicting interests, 45 and provides that rec-
ordation in the Copyright Office gives rise to constructive notice.46 For
these reasons, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Copyright Act pre-
empts the UCC for perfecting security interests in copyrights.4 7 Cy-
bernetic is therefore important not only for its holding relating to pat-
ents, but also for its concurrence with Peregrine that the Copyright
Act, not the UCC, governs security interests in copyrights. With this
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 669 (5th ed. 1979)).
39. See Barry, supra note 6, at 588 (quoting and citing 17 U.S.C. § 205(a),
(c) (1988)).
40. 239 B.R. 917 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
41. See id. at 918.
42. Id. at 923.
43. Id. These three statutes covered security interests in copyrights, air-
crafts, and railroads. See id.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Cybernetic, 239 B.R at 921-22.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d); see also Cybernetic, 239 B.R. at 921-22.
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c); see also Cybernetic, 239 B.R. at 921-22.
47. See Cybernetic, 239 B.R.. at 922.
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backdrop in mind, the remainder of Part II will discuss some of the
problems relating to copyright-secured financing.
4s
1. Constructive notice and recordation
The central concern in intellectual property secured financing re-
lates to recording, since recording gives rise to constructive notice,
which then allows for the prioritization of security interests in a certain
piece of collateral. Specifically at issue is whether a lender should per-
fect its security interest by filing a UCC-1 financing statement 49 in a
state agency or by filing a comparable instrument in the U.S. Copyright
Office.
Usually, the "exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publi-
cation, performance, and display" created by section 106 of the Copy-
right Act do not depend upon the registration of the copyright with the
Copyright Office.50 Instead, a copyright holder gains copyright pro-
tection when the original work of authorship is fixed in "any tangible
medium."' Thus, the copyright holder is not required to take any for-
mal steps to protect its work. Otherwise, copyright registration only
becomes an issue when the holder wishes to pursue an infringement
action. 52 As articulated by the Peregrine court, however, a copyright
now must also be registered for another purpose: to perfect a security
interest in a copyright.
53
Another concern is recordation. Unlike the simple filing of a
UCC-1 financing statement, no simple equivalent exists at the federal
level. Transfers of ownership 54 filed in the Copyright Office must
meet the various requirements of sections 201 through 205 of the
Copyright Act.55 These requirements include filing documents with
48. Exposure to infringement liability presents a fifth area of concern. See
Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1719. However, infringement liability may be alle-
viated by the lender's exercise of due diligence during the execution of the se-
cured transaction.
49. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to 9-408 (1999) (controlling the filing of UCC-1
financing statements).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106 cmt. (1999).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
52. See id. §411.
53. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 203.
54. A transfer also arguably includes the granting of a security interest. See
infra note 100 and accompanying text
55. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 205 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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the "actual signature" of the transferor and providing a detailed de-
scription of the work.
56
The requirements for filing under the UCC are simpler than the
steps mandated by the Copyright Office. Under the UCC, the lender
simply files a financing statement recording its security interest under
the borrower's name in a state office, usually with the secretary of state
where the borrower's place of business is located.57 However, pursu-
ant to the holding in Peregrine, only recordation under the Copyright
Act-and not the UCC--gives rise to constructive notice to third par-
ties regarding existing liens on copyrights. This is extremely important
given that constructive notice allows prioritization of security interests
for the purposes of bankruptcy or foreclosure. 58
2. Priority
As with recordation, establishing priority under the UCC is sim-
pler than it is under the Copyright Act. While the UCC has first-to-file
rules,59 the federal rules have relate-back periods, 60 which establish
priority based upon the date of execution of the security agreement.6 '
For copyrights, the relate-back period lasts for one month, meaning that
there is a one-month lag for some transfers executed in the United
States.62 This lag allows not only for subsequent lenders to inadver-
tently take a junior security interest in a copyright, but it could also al-
low for bad faith transfers by those using the lag periods for their un-
lawful advantage.
In addition, UCC-1 financing statements are indexed by the bor-
rower's name,63 not by registration number, as with the Copyright Of-
fice.64 The UCC index thus makes it easier for lenders and third parties
to ascertain a lender's interest.
56. Id. §§ 204 to 205.
57. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to 9-408 (1999).
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c); U.C.C. § 9-103.
59. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1999) ("first to file" approach).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).
61. See Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1718-19.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d). For international transfers, the relate-back pe-
riod is two months. See id.
63. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1999).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1).
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Furthermore, under the copyright laws, separate filings must be
made for each individual work pledged as collateral;65 this is not so
with the UCC. Instead, the UCC has provisions that enable a lender to
obtain a floating lien on all of the borrower's intellectual property
without requiring specific identification of the property under the
lien. 6
3. After-acquired property and floating liens
After-acquired property is a "debtor's property that is acquired
after a security transaction and becomes additional security for pay-
ment of the debt. 67 Floating liens may be attached to any asset, in-
cluding after-acquired property, equipment, inventory, accounts receiv-
able, general intangibles-which include intellectual property-and
other personal and real property.
68
Under the current system, lenders have a difficult time establish-
ing floating liens that allow for automatic perfection in after-acquired
copyrights. This is because the proper system for recordation under
current law is two-fold. First, a lender must record its security interest
at the Copyright Office. Second, the lender must ensure that the bor-
rower has registered the copyright securing the loan. Moreover, the
Copyright Act requires that the filing identify a specific work.69
This regime forces the lender to require that the borrower register
newly authored works, which it may not wish to do, fearing disclosure
of confidential information. But this is not the end of the story. The
lender must record its security interests in the borrower's new works
as they become subject to copyright registration.70 Therefore, the cur-
rent system requires the lender to make multiple, burdensome filings,
relying on the record or on the word of the borrower.71 As a result,
65. See id.
66. A floating lien is "1. [a] lien that is expanded to cover any additional
property obtained by the debtor while the debt is outstanding [or] 2. [a] lien that
continues to exist even when the collateral changes in character, classification, or
location." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 934.
67. Id. at 61; see also U.C.C. § 9-204 (1999).
68. See BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 934.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1) (1994).
70. In other words, the lender has to record its security interest in the work
once the work becomes copyrightable.
71. Of course, lenders need not rely on the borrowers' word, but may pro-
tect themselves via contract. The borrowers will be contractually bound to
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problems with enforcement abound, even for diligent borrowers and
lenders.72
On the other hand, the UCC allows for the easy encumbrance of
intellectual property.73 Section 9-204 of the UCC permits lenders to
obtain a security interest in after-acquired property,74 and section 9-110
permits lenders to perfect that interest by filing a statement containing a
broad description of the collateral.75 Thus, lenders do not have to make
multiple, specific filings under the UCC as they would under the Copy-
right Act.
B. Case Law
When Judge Kozinski authored National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capi-
tol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 76 in 1990, he set the debate regard-
ing copyright-secured financing into full throttle. As a result, Pere-
grine, and the cases that followed it, have "forced bankers to act like
copyright lawyers, and [have] forced the U.S. Copyright Office into the
business of secured financing.' 77 These are mutually unfamiliar and
inefficient roles for these players, which only create further uncertainty,
contributing to intellectual property's devaluation for finance purposes.
Consequently, because of this uncertain state of affairs, lenders con-
tinue to pursue a "belt and suspenders" approach to perfection.78 The
following discussion will further illuminate the conflict.
register the works. The lenders could also contract for power of attorney to ef-
fect the borrowers' copyright registration itself. Even if this is the case, how-
ever, there still needs to be a mechanism whereby the borrowers notify the
lenders of the newly authored works.
72. Furthermore, some copyright libraries may be so big that, even after a
thorough effort to list all of the copyrights in the library has been attempted,
the borrower may overlook some items. Thus, despite extensive due diligence,
omissions may occur. This may, however, hurt the borrower more than the
lender: Since the determination of the loan amount depends upon the value of
the collateral, it is in the borrower's best interests to ensure that all assets appear
on the collateral list.
73. See U.C.C. § 9-103 (1999).
74. See id. § 9-204.
75. See id. § 9-110.
76. 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
77. Johnson, Hearings, supra note 25.
78. See Choate, supra note 8, at 1416-17.
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1. National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan
Ass 'n-catalyst for debate
As mentioned above, the Peregrine court brought the issue of
copyright-secured financing to the fore. Until then, no federal court
had considered this topic. 79 In June of 1985, Capitol Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Denver (Capitol Federal) extended a six mil-
lion dollar line of credit to American National Enterprises, Inc., the
predecessor of National Peregrine, Inc. (NPI). 80 To secure this trans-
action, NPI pledged "[a]ll inventory consisting of films and all ac-
counts, contract rights, chattel paper, general intangibles, instruments,
equipment, and documents related to such inventory." 81 On January
30, 1989, NPI filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition.82 Just over two
months later, NPI filed an amended complaint against Capitol Fed-
eral." NPI claimed that Capitol Federal's interests in NPI's library and
accounts receivable were unperfected because Capitol Federal had
failed to record its security interest with the Copyright Office. 84 As a
debtor in possession, NPI had the right to avoid any unperfected secu-
rity interest.8"
First, the Peregrine court held that the Copyright Act broadly pre-
empts state law with regard to security interests in copyrights.86 In
general, federal law preempts state law when the two conflict, when
federal law is so pervasive as to occupy an entire area, or when there
79. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 197.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 197-98.
82. See id. at 198.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 550 and 1107 (1999). This was a
novel argument at that time. Before Peregrine, lenders perfected their security
interests in copyrights by either treating the copyrights as trade secrets or by
filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the respective state office. See Johnson,
Hearings, supra note 25.
86. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 201-02 ("The court... concludes that any
state recordation system pertaining to interests in copyrights would be pre-
empted by the Copyright Act."). The U.S. Constitution also supports this
view, stating that "[tjhe Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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are unique federal interests involved.87 Here, the court followed the
latter two rationales, since the Copyright Act is a very expansive act,
providing for comprehensive federal regulation, and since "Congress
left no room for supplementary state regulation."
88
Second, the Peregrine court held that lenders must record their se-
curity interests in copyrights in the Copyright Office and also register
the copyright underlying the loan.89 This holding poses significant
problems for both lenders and borrowers, forcing them to formally
register the works used as collateral.90 Although forced registration re-
duces false claims of ownership to copyrights, it is unduly difficult for
a lender to effectively and efficiently ensure that the borrower register
not only existing copyrightable works, but also any future works sub-
ject to the lender's lien.
If the collateral is a single work not subject to revision, this
requirement of registration may not be a great burden because the
lender can easily ensure that the borrower registers the single work. In
most cases, however, the collateral undergoes significant changes, as
with a screenplay9 ' or software,92 each change requiring a separate
87. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199.
88. Id. (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
89. See id. at 203.
90. According to § 411 of the Copyright Act, the only time copyright hold-
ers must register their copyrights is when they wish to bring an infringement
action. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1994). Thus, the Peregrine holding essentially
created another category of mandatory filers.
91. In the case of film financing, films are commonly registered when they
are substantially complete and ready for release. See Engel & Montgomery,
Hearings, supra note 23. Under Peregrine, lenders must record their security
interest in the films in the Copyright Office and also ensure that borrowers
register their films in the Copyright Office. However, early registration of a
film poses certain problems. For instance, early registration can technically
perfect the lender's security interest in only the preliminary stages of film pro-
duction (e.g., the script). Unless the borrower registers the film at frequent in-
tervals, including the final film product, the lender's security interest will not
be perfected. Practically speaking then, a lender's security interest in a film
may remain unperfected until it has disbursed some of the funds to the bor-
rower, during which time the borrower may make potentially conflicting trans-
fers to other bona fide purchasers. See Steven Weinberger, Note, Perfection of
Security Interests in Copyrights: The Peregrine Effect on the Orion Pictures
Plan of Reorganization, 11 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959, 960 (1993).
92. Under § 408(a), a work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium enjoys
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registration. Additionally, developers of software often do not register
their copyrights because of the desire not to disclose the contents of
their product in a public manner. This strongly suggests that the law
should not require computer software developers to endanger through
public disclosure the most valuable asset they own in order to use it as
collateral.
Further, since each revision of the collateral is subject to a new
registration, the registration requirement unduly burdens the lender.
To comply with this requirement, the lender must ensure that the bor-
rower has registered each work used as collateral, in addition to each
revision of the work,93 for the lender to retain value in the collateral.
But, as stated above, the borrower may not wish to register the copy-
right because of the confidential nature of its intellectual property.
94
Also, even if a lender could employ a floating lien on after-acquired
copyright protection, regardless of whether or not the copyright is registered
with the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994). Computer software
is thought to be such a work. See In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517,
520 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) (citing Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981); TDS Healthcare Sys. Corp. v.
Humana Hosp. Ill., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1572, 1581-82 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing
CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 358 (M.D. Ga.
1992))).
Computer software, however, presents distinct problems. Since software
is constantly being modified, the modifications are separately copyrightable as
"derivative works." See Radcliffe & Nelsen, supra note 34, at 236 (likening a
computer software program to a layer cake, each layer representing a "new
version or revision of the software ... protected by a separate copyright").
This indicates that subsequent versions of a computer software are subject to
copyright registration separate from the original version of the software. As
such, a single computer software can be composed of several copyrights, in
addition to any other intangible rights which may relate to the software, such
as patents, trademarks, or trade secrets.
93. In one transaction secured by software, both the borrower and the
lender expressed deep concern over the requirement of registration. See John-
son, Hearings, supra note 25. The borrower did not want to register its copy-
right because of the confidential nature of the software, a concern shared by
the lender as well. See id. In addition, the lender was concerned that there was
insufficient code to warrant registration in the Copyright Office. See id. The
lender was also troubled that it would need to update the registration and also
its security interest at frequent intervals. See id. For these reasons, the trans-
action was delayed by several weeks, adversely affecting the relationship be-




property,95 it is unreasonable for the lender and the borrower to con-
tinually register every copyright that ultimately may or may not be-
come valuable.96
Third, the Peregrine court held that the Copyright Act not only
governs the perfection of security interests in copyrights, but also in the
accounts receivable they generate.97 The court reasoned that because a
copyright entitles the copyright holder to receive all the proceeds from
a work's display, afortiori, an agreement creating a security interest in
those proceeds must also be recorded at the Copyright Office.98 This
reasoning stretches copyright law beyond its scope. Reaching a more
accurate conclusion, the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch99 held
that "[a]ssignments of interests in royalties have no relationship to the
existence, scope, duration or identification of a copyright, nor to 'rights
under a copyright,"' and thus are not "documents 'pertaining to a copy-
right.""'  If future courts view copyright royalties in this manner, the
95. Although the Copyright Office does not allow for the perfection of se-
curity interests in after-acquired property, the UCC does. Under the UCC, the
lender need only file a financing statement describing the property in general.
See supra notes 57, 63-64 and accompanying text
96. See Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1694-95 (discussing practical problems
under Peregrine).
97. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199. UCC § 9-106 includes royalty income
or accounts receivable, and also the intellectual property, that is the basis of
these income flows, in the definition of "general intangibles." See U.C.C. § 9-
106 cmt. (1999).
98. See Peregrine, 116 B.R, at 199.
99. 104F.3d 1163 (9thCir. 1997).
100. Id. at 1166 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994)). As one commentator has
stated:
Determining whether a security interest is a transfer or an assignment
is essential to understanding the application of the law. The distinc-
tion between transfer and assignment rests on whether title in the un-
derlying property passes. If title does not pass, then the interest is
transferred; if title does pass, the interest is assigned. Security inter-
ests are transfers and not assignments, therefore, under a strict reading
of the Copyright Act... the security interest in the copyright must be
recorded at the federal level ....
Shubha Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules & Liability Rules: An Intel-
lectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 99, 117-18 (1997); see also Haemmerli, su-
pra note 4, at 1682 n.184 ("The right to receive royalty income is simply not
the same thing as the right to reproduce, distribute, display or perform a work
even if it is implied by, or is a corollary of, those rights.").
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resulting case law will likely direct lenders to treat royalty interests un-
der the UCC provisions, and not under federal copyright law. 101
Furthermore, as a right arising from the sales license of intellectual
property, accounts receivable do not fall within the definition of copy-
right under section 102 because they are not "works" as defined by the
Copyright Act.10 2 Moreover, federal law does not control accounts re-
ceivable under private licenses, which are also traditionally within the
realm of state commercial law.' 0 3 Thus, licenses in federal intellectual
property are contracts governed by state contract law.' 0 4 Most con-
vincingly, the Copyright Act does not mention any security interests in
accounts receivable.' 0 5 If Congress intended to include accounts re-
ceivable under the administration of the Copyright Act, it probably
would have done so explicitly, given that state law already regulates
interests in accounts receivable.
Finally, although the Peregrine court found federal preemption in
the area of copyright-based transactions, the court did not define the
boundaries of federal preemption of the UCC.10 6 Specifically, Pere-
grine focused on the filing issue without addressing the extent to which
the UCC may, nevertheless, govern other aspects of secured financing,
such as enforcement. Thus, it appears that the UCC rules would still
101. A decision from a higher court, Broadcast Music questions the Pere-
grine holding. See Broadcast Music, 104 F.3d at 1163. It distinguishes copy-
rights from the contract rights that arise from reselling or licensing them. See
id.
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
103. See Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., 871 F.2d 1082,
1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A license agreement is a contract governed by ordi-
nary principles of state contract law .... That the present contract is a patent
license does not mean that state laws ... cannot be applied to it."); see also
McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (fol-
lowing the same principle).
104. See Power Lift, Inc., 871 F.2d at 1085.
105. See Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1681-85 (offering several arguments
for why the Copyright Act should not govern the perfection of security inter-
ests in accounts receivable, including the absence of any mention of accounts
receivable from the Copyright Act itself); see also Engel & Montgomery,
Hearings, supra note 23 (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-109, and 9-306 and Broad-
cast Music as authority for the proposition that the UCC should govern ac-
counts receivable pertaining to copyrights).
106. For more commentary on the need for clearly defined boundaries, see
Choate, supra note 8, at 1418 n.16.
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apply to a foreclosure on a copyright-secured loan, especially since the
Copyright Act does not contain an analogous provision.
2. AEG Acquisition Corp. v. Zenith Productions Ltd.
In 1993, AEG Acquisition Corp. v. Zenith Productions Ltd.0 7 up-
held the Peregrine two-step process for the perfection of a security in-
terest in copyrights.'0 8 AEG Acquisition Corp. (AEG) gave Zenith
Productions Ltd. (Zenith) a security interest in three films in 1989 as
part of a restructuring agreement.' 09 To perfect its security interest in
the films, Zenith filed financing statements in the relevant states and
recorded a copyright mortgage with the Copyright Office." 0 Zenith,
however, filed a certificate of copyright registration covering only one
of the three films."' Zenith did not do the same for the other two films
because it thought that those films, which were foreign works, were
exempt from registration by the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)." 2
On July 12, 1989, AEG filed a chapter 11 petition." 3 The bank-
ruptcy court rejected Zenith's claim that Zenith could perfect its secu-
rity interest in the foreign films without first registering them under the
theory that searches for security interests in copyrights are conducted
either by work title or by registration number. Thus, if a copyright is
not registered, a security interest in it cannot be searched.
The court also held that although "authors of Berne Convention
works are entitled to copyright protections without complying with
formalities [such as registration] . . . United States law provides no
[such] exemptions for Berne Convention works" with respect to
107. 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. See id. at 58.
109. See id. at 53.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. The Berne Convention, to which the United States became a
member in March 1, 1989, is a multilateral international treaty that offers
heightened copyright protection to authors. See Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris,
July 24, 1971, 828 UNTS 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also 17
U.S.C. § 411 (1994). For international copyrights or copyrights in interna-
tional transactions, see supra note 11 and accompanying text
113. See AEG Acquisition Corp., 161 B.R. at 53-54.
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perfection." 4 Furthermore, the court noted that section 205 of the
Copyright Act, which deals with the recordation of copyright transfers,
does not distinguish foreign from domestic works.1"5 Therefore, Ze-
nith's failure to register the two foreign films in the Copyright Office
and record its security interest in them resulted in Zenith's interests
being unperfected in those films.'1 6 This turned Zenith into an unse-
cured creditor, similar to Capitol Federal in Peregrine.
3. In re Avalon Software, Inc.
In In re Avalon Software, Inc.,' 17 the Arizona court primarily ad-
dressed Peregrine's unclear delineation of federal preemption and is-
sues relating to after-acquired property and works-in-progress." 8 The
lender, Imperial Bank, had lent money to Avalon Software, Inc. (Ava-
lon), a computer software developer, secured by Avalon's personal
property, including accounts, general intangibles, equipment inventory,
and proceeds."19 The security agreement12 0 used in this transaction
contained a standard after-acquired property clause.'
2 '
Although Imperial Bank filed a UCC-1 financing statement with
the appropriate state agencies, it failed to record in the Copyright Of-
fice. 122 Moreover, although Avalon registered its copyrights with the
Copyright Office between 1986 and 1991, it did not thereafter register
any copyrights on its newly developed products or modifications of
its already registered products. 23 When Avalon filed a chapter 11 pe-
tition, it owed Imperial Bank $1,483,662.124 Avalon challenged the
114. Id. at 57; see Berne Convention, art. 5(2) (stating that "[t]he enjoyment
and the exercise of... rights [under the Berne Convention] shall not be subject
to any formality").
115. See AEG Acquisition Corp., 161 B.R. at 57.
116. See id.
117. 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
118. See id. at 520.
119. See id. at519.
120. The UCC defines "security agreement" as "an agreement which creates
or provides for a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(1) (1999).
121. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 519.
122. See id. at 519-20.
123. See id. at 520.
124. See id. at 519.
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perfection of Imperial Bank's security interests in Avalon's various as-
sets purported to secure this significant loan.
125
Unlike the Peregrine court, the court in Avalon had the opportu-
nity to discuss the issue of after-acquired property. The Avalon court
stated that a lender can, by filing one security agreement with the
Copyright Office, perfect in after-acquired property if it registers the
individual future works or modifications. This at least saves the lender
from filing a security agreement for future works.'
26
As a result, Avalon gave more leeway for after-acquired property
than did Peregrine. According to Avalon, if a lender properly files its
security interest at the Copyright Office from the start of the transac-
tion, an "after-acquired" clause would protect the bank upon default or
bankruptcy. 27 The court found no logical way to separate original
works ripe for copyright registration from their derivatives, including
enhancements, offshoots, and modifications. 28  This still poses a
problem, however, since perfection depends upon registration of up-
dates which is one of the major problems of the Peregrine holding.
Furthermore, the Avalon court stated that the Copyright Act gov-
erns everything that is copyrightable; thus, if the intellectual property-
for example, computer software--is not copyrighted but could be,
the developer cannot call it a trade secret and thereby circumvent the
125. See id. at 520.
126. See id. at 522-23. Of course, the Avalon holding somewhat robs the
definition of after-acquired property of its meaning. By using an after-
acquired clause, a lender hopes to forego the registration and recordation re-
quirements for future works. This holding seems to indicate that although a
lender can include an after-acquired provision in the security agreement, the
lender still has to ensure that the copyright holder registers all future relevant
copyrights. Avalon at least indicates, however, that the lender no longer has to
file subsequent security agreements covering the after-acquired property. See
id. Importantly, the Avalon court upheld the Peregrine requirement of regis-
tration. But since one of the problems of the registration requirement is back-
logging at the Copyright Office, this holding does not help because the lender
still must require the borrower to register every copyright. See also Choate,
supra note 8, at 1442 (arguing that the holding in Avalon does not decrease the
risks involved in copyright-secured financing because the transaction would
still be halted while the borrower registers present and any future copyrights at
the Copyright Office).
127. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 522-23.
128. See id. at 522.
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Peregrine requirements.129 But this fails to consider the practice of
software developers who, instead of treating their software as copy-
rights, treat them as trade secrets in order to avoid revealing the code
through registration.' 30  Therefore, the registration requirement com-
pels disclosure of confidential information, which may bar the copy-
right holder's ability to obtain financing if it is unwilling to disclose its
intellectual property.
After determining that the Copyright Act controls security inter-
ests in copyrights, the Avalon court held that the Copyright Act "also
extends to the proceeds naturally derived from the copyrighted mate-
rial.' 131 Avalon did not, however, explain why this is so. 132 But if a
loan is secured only with the proceeds of a copyright, such as the ac-
counts receivable or the licensing proceeds, and not the work itself,
does this mean that the transaction is still subject to the Peregrine re-
quirements of recordation and registration? If so, the result is unduly
burdensome and needlessly expensive.
Ill. EVALUATING THE RECENT PROPOSALS
There are currently three reform proposals that have been raised
as potential solutions to the concerns discussed thus far: the Federal
Intellectual Property Security Act, the Proposed Copyright Filing
129. See id. (Attempting to call... a [copyrightable] product a 'trade se-
cret' does not change the requirement for security-interest filing at the Copy-
right Office."). In other words, parties to a transaction cannot describe the in-
tellectual property as a trade secret instead of a copyright, if that choice is
available to them, in order to avoid the recordation and registration require-
ments of Peregrine. See id. This would create an "unwarranted end-run"
around the requirements of the current law. Choate, supra note 8, at 1437-38.
130. See id. at 1438-39 (arguing that the Copyright Office maintains certain
procedures that enable copyright holders to treat their computer software as
trade secrets, driven by the "economic and strategic realities" of the technology
industry).
131. Avalon, 209 B.R. at 521.
132. Peregrine failed to explain this as well, except for its citation to § 106
which states that "because a copyright entitles the holder to receive all income
derived from the display of the creative work.., an agreement creating a secu-
rity interest in the receivables generated by a copyright may also be recorded in




Modernization Act, and the Commercial Finance Association interim
measure.
133
A. Federal Intellectual Property Security Act
The most recent reform proposal advanced by some members of
the ABA is the Federal Intellectual Property Security Act (FIPSA).
134
FIPSA advocates a dual system for perfection in copyrights where
security interests are filed at the state level and ownership interests at
the federal level.' 35 FIPSA also emphasizes that the current case law
makes it impossible for a lender to preserve its interest in unregistered
copyrights and their "proceeds" upon default or bankruptcy. 136 As a
133. On June 24, 1999, the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to address
"Intellectual Property Security Registration." See Hearings, supra note 23,
available in <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/ct0624.htn> (visited Feb. 26,
2000) (witness list). At the hearing, the proponents of the reform proposals
and other interested parties stated their cases. These parties included the ABA,
the American Film Marketing Institute, the U.S. Copyright Office, the Com-
mercial Finance Association, the Motion Picture Association of America, the
International Trademark Association, the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, and Professor John T. Cross of the University of Louisville
School of Law. See id.
At the hearing, Fritz E. Attaway voiced the singular opinion that the cur-
rent law does not need reform, since copyright holders seem to be getting fi-
nancing. See Hearings, supra note 23 (statement of Fritz E. Attaway, Senior
Vice President of Government Relations and Washington General Counsel for
the MPAA), available in <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/atta0624.htrn>
(visited Jan. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Attaway, Hearings]. However, given the
controversial case law and the mismatched federal and state laws on this topic,
along with the disparate voices urging change, there is a distinct need for re-
form.
To date, commercial attorneys, with lender-clients unwilling or hesitant
to enter into transactions secured with intellectual property, continue to have
important questions regarding intellectual property secured financing. For this
and many other significant reasons explored in this article, this area of finance
law needs immediate reform. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
134. At the June 24, 1999, congressional hearing, the Section of Intellectual
Property Law and the Section of Business Law of the ABA presented FIPSA.
See Engel & Montgomery, Hearings, supra note 23. FIPSA, however, is not
the official viewpoint of the ABA, since it has not been approved by the
ABA's House of Delegates or its Board of Governors. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. For a fuller analysis of copyright-secured financing within the
setting of bankruptcy, see Elise B. May, Comment, Where Your Priorities
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result, lenders are hesitant or entirely unwilling to make loans secured
by intellectual property. Moreover, even if a lender enters into an in-
tellectual property secured transaction, the lender devalues the intel-
lectual property to reflect the risks and uncertainty associated with this
type of lending.
137
FIPSA uses Article 9 of the UCC to govern the perfection of secu-
rity interests, while employing a federal filing system to establish pri-
ority among outright transfers.138 In proposing this mixed state and
federal filing system, FIPSA asserts that lenders prefer the UCC filing
system because: (1) the UCC permits floating liens on after-acquired
property without requiring registration of derivative works; (2) the
UCC notice filings can be done by describing the collateral in general
terms, even in advance of the closing of the transaction; (3) a lender
can conduct UCC searches in the applicable state by reference to the
debtor-owner's name, instead of by registration number in the Copy-
right Office; and (4) the UCC does not use any look-back provisions.1
39
In line with the above reasons, FIPSA seeks to: (1) establish a
"mixed approach" for recordation where (a) the relevant federal agency
governs the filing of security interests with respect to subsequent trans-
ferees of ownership, and (b) the relevant state UCC governs the filing
of security interests with respect to secured parties and lien creditors;
(2) utilize the same type of notice filing in the federal agencies relating
to security interests as in state agencies under the UCC, without re-
quiring specific identification of the properties and without requiring
recordation of the security agreement itself; (3) allow perfection of se-
curity interests in after-acquired property, as does the UCC; (4) elimi-
nate or reduce the look-back periods, requiring prompt recording and
indexing by the federal agencies; and (5) reduce the agencies' burden
of handling and recording security interests by implementing an elec-
tronic filing system.
140
The Peregrine court, however, aptly described the central argu-
ment against this type of dual filing:
Should Be: Analysis of the Perfection and Priority of Security Interests in
Copyrights as It Affects Bankruptcy, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 509 (1994/1995).
137. See Engel & Montgomery, Hearings, supra note 23.
138. See id.
139. See id. Look-back provisions are also known as relate-back provisions.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
140. See Engel & Montgomery, Hearings, supra note 23.
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A recordation scheme best serves its purpose where
interested parties can obtain notice of all encumbrances by
referring to a single, precisely defined recordation system.
The availability of parallel state recordation systems that
could put parties on constructive notice as to encumbrances
on copyrights would surely interfere with the effectiveness
of the federal recordation scheme. Given the virtual ab-
sence of dual recordation schemes in our legal system...
any state recordation system pertaining to interests in copy-
rights would be preempted by the Copyright Act.
141
In other words, searchers need a specific place to look to determine
whether a particular interest has been encumbered or transferred out-
right.' 42 "To the extent there are competing recordation schemes, this
lessens the utility of each."'143 Since FIPSA presents a mixed approach,
it falls within this uneasy framework of "competing recording systems"
when it comes to filing different types of interests in a copyright.
This mixed approach also applies an awkward state framework to
federal copyrights, which are "simultaneously everywhere, and highly
divisible" with "complex chains of title."' 44 As national assets, they
should be "supported by a single, unified federal recording system
in the Copyright Office.' 145 Also, since copyrights are "incorporeal,"
lacking a "fixed situs[,] a number of state authorities could be relevant"
for the purpose of conducting a search, thereby increasing the bur-
den on searchers.' 46 Such a dual system, requiring federal filing for
141. National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R.
194, 201-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990); see also Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1716-19 (ar-
guing against a dual filing system in favor of a purely federal regime). For
further arguments against dual filing, see Choate, supra note 8, at 1444-46
(raising the issue of registered and unregistered copyrights in light of a dual
filing scheme).
142. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 200-02.
143. Id. at200.
144. Brennan, Hearings, supra note 24.
145. Id. In extending this argument to patents and trademarks, the Patent
and Trademark Office would be the corollary of the Copyright Office. As
such, the federal recording system for patents and trademarks would be in the
Patent and Trademark Office. However, due to the inherent differences among
the various types of intellectual property, the solution for copyrights may not
be the best solution for patents and trademarks, which deserve separate analy-
ses.
146. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at200.
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ownership interests and state filing for security interests, would inevi-
tably lead to uncertainty, expense, and delay. Third parties, such as
lenders and potential purchasers, who conduct searches would also be
unsure that all relevant jurisdictions have been searched. 1
47
In contrast, the UCC, which has been adopted by all fifty states,
"deals with assets that are either located in an easily identifiable place
•.. or, in the case of intangibles, presumed to exist only at the location
of the debtor.. . rarely hav[ing] complex chains of title.' ' 148 Mixing
the straightforward UCC approach and federal law is a "recipe for dis-
aster.' 149 Only one system can prevail. Where, even under current
law, a lender can conduct a single search of the records in the Copy-
right Office to find all prior copyright liens, under FIPSA, the lender
must search the UCC filing systems in addition to the Copyright Office
to discover whether a copyright is already encumbered by a lien.' 50
"[E]nsuring a clear chain of title... is critical" to determine the
parties who have security interests in the copyrights.' 5' Current recor-
dation practice takes this into account: The Copyright Office is the
only place where a lender goes to conduct a search for existing liens.
Under FIPSA, every lender must search both state and federal records
because if a borrower has sold outright ownership, it will show up only
in the federal records, but senior liens will show up in state records.'
52
A purchaser would also have to search both records because it needs to
know whether it is acquiring title free of liens.'
53
Another possible concern is the increased leverage that FIPSA
would give to lenders by enabling liens on after-acquired property.'
54
147. See id.
148. Brennan, Hearings, supra note 24.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Attaway, Hearings, supra note 133.
152. See Engel & Montgomery, Hearings, supra note 23.
153. See id. Applied to the argument against FIPSA, Cybernetic is another
indication that interests in copyrights should remain in the exclusive arena of
federal law. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text
154. See Attaway, Hearings, supra note 133 (arguing that the balance in
FIPSA would "tilt the field in favor of financial institutions"); see also Hear-
ings, supra note 23 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights,
U.S. Copyright Office), available in <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/cpypub/
regstat62499r.html> (visited Feb. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Peters, Hearings]. The
Copyright Office recognizes the "legal advantages for [a] financing institution
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If a lender can claim an interest in already existing or future property,
the copyright holder would potentially be giving up too much collateral
or too many rights to the lender.'
B. Proposed Copyright Filing Modernization Act
In stark contrast to FIPSA, the Proposed Copyright Filing
Modernization Act (CFMA) is a purely federal solution to the problem
of copyright-secured financing advanced by the American Film
Marketing Institute (AFMI)'
5 6
The AFMI cites two issues that are problematic for lenders-
floating liens and after-acquired property 57---and advocates a purely
federal regime. 158  In establishing a federal solution, the AFMI
proposes to create a facility in the Copyright Office to house
constructive notice filings against persons and works. 59 In other
words, the Copyright Office would maintain both a "person index" and
a "work" index. Parties would file a "person registration statement,"
similar to the copyright work registration statement. 6  Recorded
transfers would then be indexed against the parties in the "person
register" or the work in the "work register."'161 These filings would be
to describe the encumbered property as broadly as possible, but [argues] that
those advantages would be outweighed by the disadvantages" for copyright
holders and the public. Id. The two primary advantages the Copyright Office
cites regarding the current system for perfection are that: (1) the law limits
constructive notice to documents that specifically identify the works; and (2)
recordation happens when parties file actual documents which are made public
record. See id.
155. The implications for valuation are enormous. The loan could be
secured for more than it is worth, limiting the author's borrowing capacity.
156. See Brennan, Hearings, supra note 24. The AFMI is a trade association
of almost 200 independent film and television production and distribution
companies and Affiliated Financial Institutions. See id.
157. See id.
158. In contrast, a fully state system would not work for copyright-secured
financing, since Congress would have to transfer the federal role of ensuring
uniformity in tracking interests to the state agencies; this is impractical because
the federal government already has a recording system for interests in
copyrights as well as a uniform registration system. See Baldwin, supra note
5, at 1721 n.102.
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linked in a computerized, relational database.' 62  The relational
database would include two indices, one organized by debtor name and
the other by work name. Either index would impute constructive
notice, create priority, and be necessary for perfection.
163
A major argument against CFMA is that it imposes practical
difficulties on the Copyright Office and on parties involved in
copyright-secured transactions.'64 Opponents assert that a federal
scheme would require the complete revamping of the current
copyright system, claiming that the Copyright Office is not
institutionally equipped to track security interests. However, the
alternative provided by the opponents would pose even greater
obstacles for the Copyright Office and related parties. In particular,
the dual filing approach, recommended by FIPSA, would require the
Copyright Office to continually coordinate its scheme with the state
filing agencies, since ownership interests would be filed with the
Copyright Office and security interests with the states. This forced
partnership would also impose great obstacles to borrowers and
lenders because they would essentially have to follow two different
sets of laws to verify that their liens are unencumbered by existing
interests.
Opponents also argue that a purely federal approach would
"federalize" state finance law.165 This argument, however, is not an
accurate representation of the federal proposal. Under the CFMA,
the Copyright Act would merely govern the creation and perfection
of security interests in copyrights, not the subsequent measures taken
when, for example, a borrower defaults on a loan. Since the other
important functions of commercial law will be governed by the UCC,
secured transactions will not wholly enter the federal domain.
C. Commercial Finance Association Interim Measure
The Commercial Finance Association (CFA) also proposed its
interim measure at the June 24, 1999, hearing. 166 This measure would
162. See id.
163. Seeid.
164. See Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1734.
165. Id.
166. See Johnson, Hearings, supra note 25. The CFA is a trade group for
the asset-based financial services industry. See id.
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provide temporary relief to a strained system, giving more time to
deliberate on complete reform legislation that covers all forms of
federal intellectual property. In proposing this interim measure, the
CFA opposes Peregrine, arguing that federal law does not preempt
state law with respect to recordation. The CFA also emphasizes the
need for a comprehensive recording statute governing all types of
intellectual property. 67 The CFA, apparently in agreement with the
Copyright Office, 6 8 suggests that "[b]efore taking on comprehensive
reform, solving the immediate needs of the financing community by
allowing the perfection of a security interest in copyrighted material
through a [UCC] filing seems desirable."'
169
As proposed, the interim measure would amend the Copyright Act
to allow a lender, through a UCC filing, to perfect a security interest in
both copyrighted and copyrightable material.170 This would only affect
the rights of holders of security interests and lien creditors, not the
rights of outright transferees of a copyright. Such bona fide purchasers
or licensees would continue to take free and clear of any security
interest filed only at the state level under the UCC,171 emphasizing the
point that a lender should file federally to be safe.
Thus, if the subsequent party is a purchaser, that party need look
for a filing in the Copyright Office. 172 If the security interest is not
recorded there, the purchaser or licensee would take the copyright free
and clear of security interests. Further, if an outright transferee elects
to conduct a search for UCC recorded security interests, the outright
transferee would search in the borrower's resident state.
173
The CFA's proposal would thus "allow a secured lender with a
[UCC] perfected security interest to prevail over bankruptcy trustees
and other secured parties when copyrighted and copyrightable material
are offered as collateral."' 74 This measure would "also conform the
167. See id.
168. See Peters, Hearings, supra note 154.
169. Johnson, Hearings, supra note 25.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. This would eliminate the concern that one body of law controls security
interests while another controls title. See Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1723-24.
173. See Johnson, Hearings, supra note 25.
174. Id.
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law covering the treatment of copyright security interests in bankruptcy
to the law covering patents and trademarks in that arena.'1
7 5
Ultimately, this interim measure is similar to FIPSA: Both
measures propose that the UCC "govern the creation, attachment,
perfection, priority and enforcement of security interests, while federal
law should govern the rights of a person other than a secured party or
lien creditor who acquires any other right or interest in intellectual
property.' 76  Due to this similarity, the CFA's interim measure
encounters similar problems facing FIPSA.
177
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION: NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIoN
In assessing the landscape of intellectual property secured
financing, one thing is clear: Immediate action is needed. 178 But what
form should that action take? On the one hand, borrowers want to
protect their rights in their works. 7 9 On the other hand, lenders want
to ensure that the intellectual property used as collateral is, first,
adequately valued and, second, properly perfected. In other words,
lenders want to feel as safe as possible with the funds that they loan.'80
Currently, to ensure perfection under federal law, the lender must
take the following steps:
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text
178. Note that Peregrine and Avalon are district court and bankruptcy court
decisions, respectively. As such, they are not binding on either Ninth Circuit
courts or courts elsewhere. "For this reason alone, creditors seeking to perfect
security interests in copyrights should continue to file at both the federal and
state levels." Choate, supra note 8, at 1442. This is also why Congress must
pass' a reform law regarding copyright-secured financing, to avoid the problem
of jurisdictional treatments of federal assets. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text
179. See Peters, Hearings, supra note 154 (presenting arguments in favor of
copyright holders, including the concern that lenders may exercise too much
"leverage" over copyright holders if lenders are allowed to attach floating liens
to after-acquired property and if lenders are allowed to describe the assets in
general terms).
180. In its most basic form, the issue of intellectual property secured
financing is identical to secured financing. For this reason, the same basic




(1) conduct a thorough audit of all the borrower's
copyrights and copyrightable material, (2) require the
borrower to register any copyrightable material, (3) enter
into a security agreement that identifies each of the
copyrights by title or registration number, (4) record the
security agreement with the Copyright Office, (5) establish
a reporting and monitoring process with respect to the
borrower's existing and after-acquired copyrights, (6)
require the borrower to register all after-acquired
copyrights, and (7) record any additional security interests
with the Copyright Office as additional copyrights
(including derivative works, enhancements and
modifications... [)].81
These requirements for perfection create difficulties and questions
for both borrowers and lenders. As discussed in this section, the best
way to satisfy both parties is through a federal system with a simple
recording scheme. 112  As suggested by the Peregrine court, federal
copyright laws provide a predictable and stable scheme for copyright
ownership and a uniform national system for perfection that avoids the
problems associated with determining and enforcing parties' lights
under the differing laws and courts of the various states.
183
181. Johnson, Hearings, supra note 25.
182. A mixed approach is "not consistent with the goals and policies of
commercial credit law and fails to give proper recognition to strong federal
policy interests." Baldwin, supra note 5, at 1720. Much has been written on
the issue of federal preemption of Article 9 with respect to intellectual property
secured financing. For discussions arguing in favor of federal preemption, see
generally Baldwin, supra note 5; Choate, supra note 8; Klumb, supra note 26;
May, supra note 136; Watterberg, supra note 8. For discussions arguing in
favor of a dual filing regime, see generally Paul A. Baumgarten, Copyrights as
Collateral: Perfection Finally Perfected after Peregrine?, 71 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 581 (1994); Barry, supra note 6; Haemmerli, supra note 4; Harold R.
Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Easing Transfer and Security Interest
Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 KY. L.J. 61
(1990-91).
An additional argument supporting federal preemption of the UCC
involves copyrights used in international secured transactions. Since
copyrights are national assets by explicit mandate of the U.S. Constitution, it
makes sense that parties involved in international transactions conduct their
searches in a national agency, not in individual state offices. See Brennan,
supra note 11, at 210.
183. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199.
Ar'l-ril 2000) 1235
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1205
Accordingly, since the AFMI's proposal best embraces these
characteristics, the author suggests that the CFMA represents the
preferred base model.
A. Recordation: A Federal Answer to a Federal Question
Consistent with federal copyright policy,184 a single, purely federal
filing system would establish uniformity for those seeking to file
security interests or outright ownership interests involving federal
intellectual property.'85 Such a filing system would not only serve as a
means of recording such interests, but would also give rise to
constructive notice to lien creditors, secured creditors, and other third
parties, including purchasers and assignees for value. The constructive
notice would also form the basis for establishing priority among the
various parties. However, since a copyright usually fonns only a part
of the collateral package securing a loan,18 6 a lender perfecting a
security interest in the copyright will most likely also search state UCC
records for all of the assets within the collateral package. Given this
fact, it may appear that recording a security interest in the state system
better serves the goal of convenience. Contrary to this initial
appearance, however, this argument rests in equipoise, since a lender
who takes a copyright as part of its collateral package must also search
the Copyright Office for outright transfers of the copyright because the
collateral package will most likely contain other forms of property.
Moreover, given the formidable federal concerns in support of
maintaining a uniform system governing national assets,' 87 the scale
184. "The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either [the
right to copyright a work or patent an invention], and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of
Congress." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), at 309 (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). Another goal is to maintain a single national
measure for the efficient exchange of copyrighted works. See 1 MELVILLE
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[A] (1999); see
also Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 200 (citing "Congress's policy that copyrights be
readily transferable in commerce" as a major policy of federal copyright law).
185. Certain kinds of state intellectual property-such as trade secrets-
would be excluded from this regime.
186. A collateral package often includes other forms of intellectual property
and other real, personal, and intangible property. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 12, 183-85 and accompanying text.
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tips in favor of recording security interests exclusively in the Copyright
Office.
B. After-Acquired Property, Floating Liens, and Other
Filing Requirements
Until Peregrine, the only time a copyright holder was required to
register a copyright was prior to bringing an infringement action. The
Peregrine holding essentially created another category for mandatory
registration by requiring that borrowers register their copyrights in
order for lenders to perfect their security interests in the copyrights.
88
Simply put, this registration requirement is unnecessary for efficiently
transacting in copyrightable assets.' 89  The simple recordation
described above would suffice for "registering" the copyright for
purposes of a secured loan.
188. In the expanding market of electronic commerce, the contents of a Web
site often change daily. In light of this quick turn-over within Web sites, the
registration requirement may in fact be impossible to meet, not merely too
burdensome or too expensive. See Noel D. Humphreys, The Peril of
Copyrightable Materials as Security, PA. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 42, 42-43
("How does counsel prove in court the contents of a Web site on a particular
date?").
189. Even Judge Kozinski in Peregrine noted that the registration
requirement may make the purely federal system for perfection "much less
convenient than filing under the UCC." Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 202 n.10.
However, Kozinski also stated that "[i]f the mechanics of filing turn out to
pose a serious burden, it can be taken up by Congress during its oversight of
the Copyright Office or, conceivably, the Copyright Office might be able to
ameliorate the problem through exercise of its regulatory authority." Id. at 203
n.10.
Furthermore, in MCEG Sterling, Inc. v. Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim &
Ballon, 646 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1996), the Supreme Court of New York, without
explicitly questioning the holding in Peregrine, nevertheless noted that the
holding was "somewhat questionable [and novel] because the assets in
question were not themselves copyrights." Id. at 780 (citing Schuyler M.
Moore, Entertainment Bankruptcies: The Copyright Act Meets the Bankruptcy
Code, 48 Bus. LAW. 567, 571-72 (1993)). The New York court also found "no
controlling or even advisory [case law] in existence which indicated that the
accounts, royalties and contract rights at issue were a type of security interest
which must be perfected by recording with the Copyright Office." Id.
Even though MCEG Sterling arises out of a professional malpractice case
and in no way affects the case law regarding copyright-secured financing, it
sheds light on how the New York Supreme Court might rule on the matter if it
were given the opportunity. See 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (regarding the
regulatory authority of the Copyright Office).
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Furthermore, the Copyright Office already uses a form called a
"Document Cover Sheet."'190 Currently, when a lender files a security
agreement with the Copyright Office, the lender also must file a
Document Cover Sheet along with it, stating the title, author,
registration number, and date of registration of the relevant
copyrights. 191 The Document Cover Sheet and the security agreement,
however, can be filed before the copyright is actually registered. 192 If
so, the filer leaves the registration number and the date of registration
blank on the Document Cover Sheet. Under the suggested regime,
lenders would continue to use the Document Cover Sheet-or another
similar document-in this manner, but the requirement of copyright
registration for loaning purposes would be entirely eliminated, unless
specifically contracted for by the parties. If such a reform occurs,
section 205(c) of the Copyright Act, which currently states that
constructive notice arises out of registration of specific works either by
the title or by registration number of the works, would have to be
amended. 193  Specifically, the new section 205(c) would state that
constructive notice arises by filing a Document Cover Sheet and the
accompanying security agreement. If need be, the parties then can
decide to redact the security agreement to protect any sensitive
information. The parties, of course, can always register the copyright
as a final measure, but that would be a duplicative effort, not a
mandatory one.
The Copyright Act defines "transfer of copyright ownership" as
"an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright."' 194 Accounts receivable most closely
fit into this definition as "exclusive rights comprised in a copyright."' 95
However, this relation between a copyright and the proceeds that flow
from it is too attenuated to place copyright accounts receivable under
190. See Watterberg, supra note 8, at 877.
191. See Oscar L. Alcantara, The Legend of Avalon: Perfection in
Unregistered Copyrights May Not Be Possible, CBA REc., Jan. 1998, at 55.
192. See id. at 54-55 (requiring registration of a work for constructive notice
to arise even though the Copyright Office permits the lender to record its
security interest before the borrower registers the work).
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1994).




the purview of the Copyright Act. Instead, accounts receivable are
"incidentar' to, not "integral" to, copyrights. 196 As such, they should
be governed by state law-the UCC--and not by federal copyright
law. But outright sales of copyrights would still be subject to the
requirements of the Copyright Act.
Similar to the requirements under UCC section 9-203, the
Document Cover Sheet should provide a reasonable description of the
collateral' 97 and contain language specifically creating or granting a
security interest in the collateral described. If the Document Cover
Sheet is filed electronically, it need not bear any original signatures.
The lender would also file a federal financing statement or the security
agreement itself, the latter document containing a more detailed
description of the collateral, if required by the parties to the
transaction.
98
The law should be changed to allow for the recordation of floating
liens, referencing only the borrower's name--since the names of future
works may be unknown-and expressly covering after-acquired
property. This would run contrary to the current wording of section
205(c)(1), which states that a filing gives rise to constructive notice if
the recordation references a copyright by title or registration number. 199
In line with this proposal, section 205(c)(1) would allow for
constructive notice when the recorded document references only the
party name when filing a floating lien on after-acquired property. In
that case, the risk would shift to future parties seeking to take an
interest in the copyright. Thus, future parties will simply know to
196. Haemmerli, supra note 4, at 1691.
197. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1999). The requirement of describing the
collateral should include the elements of UCC § 9-110. In commercial secured
transactions, an "all asset" description would not qualify as a "reasonable
identification" of assets under this subjective standard. See Edwin E. Smith,
Overview of Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 13 (1999) (citing U.C.C.
§ 9-108(c) (1998)).
198. See, e.g., Ginter v. Real Media Group, Inc., No. 98-C3319, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6153, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1999) (quoting Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Staggs, 453 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)) (holding that a
security agreement overrides a UCC financing statement when determining the
scope of the security interest, since the "function of the financing statement is
merely to put third parties on notice that the secured party who filed it may
have a perfected security interest in the collateral described").
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1).
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search not only by the title of the copyright, but also by the name of the
copyright holder.
C. Relational Indexing, Electronic Filing, and Eliminated
Look-Back Provisions
To facilitate maximum ease in searching the records of the
Copyright Office, a relational index should be created.200  This
relational index would be comprised of two indices, one by debtor
name and the other by work description.20'
Modem technology allows, and time-sensitive transactions
necessitate, easy public access to the database. To achieve this, the
Copyright Office should create an electronic filing and searching
system with the ability to conduct simultaneous filing and searching in
the relational database.
202
To avoid complications between competing secured parties, the
new legislation should also rid itself of the antiquated look-back
periods which create a one-month lag for domestic works and a two-
month lag for international works.203 This system would be more like
the UCC and would help the lender to easily ascertain whether
competing interests already exist.
D. After the Security Interest Is Created, State Law Should Govern
What Happens Next: Foreclosure
Once a federal system is established for the creation and perfection
of security interests, state law should govern the security interest (e.g.,
foreclosure).20 4 One of the official comments to UCC section 9-302
provides support for the notion that once the lender perfects its security
interest at the federal level, upon default of the loan or upon
bankruptcy, the lender can foreclose on the loan in accordance with
Article 9.205
200. See Brennan, Hearings, supra note 24.
201. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
204. For the insiders' account of foreclosing on a loan secured by patents,
see Fry & Lee, supra note 20.
205. The official comments to UCC § 9-302 state the following:
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of...
Article [9] transactions as to which an adequate system of filing, state
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V. PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN INTERNET-BASED
COPYRIGHTS: A HYPOTHETICAL
Imagine that GameTech.com is a new company that wants to
produce on-line computer games. A consumer would go to the
GameTech.com Web site, pay for the game on-line by using a credit
card, and then be able to download the game onto a personal
computer. As the company develops new versions of the games, the
consumer can purchase and download them.
A. The Loan Transaction
To develop its business, GameTech.com seeks to obtain
financing through a bank, in addition to obtaining limited venture
capital funds.20 6 The drawback for the company, however, is that it
has no valuable assets other than various forms of intellectual
property, primarily patents and copyrights. Nevertheless, the
company needs money to fine-tune its Web site and then to market it.
After obtaining board approval for a loan, the chief financial
officer of GameTech.com approaches a certain bank. After
negotiations, the bank agrees to loan the company three million
dollars secured by the following collateral package: a library of
copyrights (the games and the Web site itself), patents (for how the
company sets up the games on-line for the purchaser to download),
and a trademark (since GameTech.com has gained recognition
among Internet-savvy consumers).
or federal, has been set up outside this Article and subsection (4)
makes clear that when such a system exists[,] perfection of a relevant
security interest can be had only through compliance with that system
(i.e., filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).
Perfection of a security interest under a... federal statute
of the type referred to in subsection (3) has all the consequences of
perfection under the provisions of [Article 9].
U.C.C. § 9-302 crt. 8, 9 (1999) (emphasis added).
Peregrine also uses this for support. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. 194, 202 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
206. The management only wants limited venture capital funding because it
wants to avoid divesting itself of significant ownership interests in the
company.
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Assuming that the bank perfects its security in the patents
and trademark,20 7 it still needs to perfect its security interest in the
copyrights since they form a very important part of the collateral
package. The bank first obtains a Document Cover Sheet from the
Copyright Office Web site.208 The bank completes this form to the
extent that it can, including the name of the copyright holder
(GameTech.com) and the name of the works (the Web site and, if
available, the games). If any of the copyrights have been registered,
the bank would also include the registration number and the date of
registration. As part of its reform efforts, the Copyright Office will
have set up an electronic filing system, which the bank can use to file
both the Document Cover Sheet and its security agreement.
In the security agreement, the bank only provides a
commercially reasonable description of the collateral, thus avoiding
the disclosure of confidential information. In this instance, the bank
would have to provide the domain address for GameTech.com and
also a general description of the games underlying the loan. The
titles of the games would be helpful but not mandatory.
Recognizing that GameTech.com will develop many revisions
and offshoots of its current games in addition to many new games,
the security agreement contains an after-acquired clause to cover any
future property. °9 If GameTech.com wishes to limit the scope of the
after-acquired clause, it can do so contractually in the security
agreement. For instance, the company may not wish to subject a
certain game and its progeny to the security agreement with the bank.
It can do this by explicitly removing it from the reach of the after-
acquired property clause. However, once the bank records the
security agreement, the bank will not need to make any subsequent
filings to perfect its security interest in the future property already
subject to that agreement. Furthermore, this single filing will
207. Note that both domestic and international transactions would be subject
to this proposed scheme. Accounts receivable, however, would fall under the
reign of the UCC, which has traditionally controlled perfection in royalties.
See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
208. See U.S. Copyright Office, U.S. Copyright Office Forms (visited Jan. 9,
2000) <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/forms/>.
209. If the parties agree, the bank can also have a floating lien, covering all
the property of GameTech.com.
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automatically be entered into a work index and a person index, since
the electronic filing will be set up in this fashion.
The filing fee can also be delivered electronically, since cur-
rent technology makes it feasible to do so. Also, since the bank files
the documents electronically, it does not need to submit original
signatures to the Copyright Office. This electronic recording will
then give rise to constructive notice. However, if the bank is worried
that the property may not be copyrightable, as a precautionary
measure, it should also file a UCC-1 financing statement in the state
where the borrower is headquartered. This is simple to do and, in
many circumstances, highly advisable.
Finally, in terms of priority, if the bank is the first to record a
security interest in these copyrights, it will have priority over any
subsequent lender on a first-to-file basis. The reform law will have
completely eliminated or substantially reduced the relate-back
periods, thus greatly reducing bad faith transfers. Finally, in the
event that GameTech.com defaults on its loan, the bank can look to
the UCC and bankruptcy law for its remedy as a secured creditor.
B. The Subsequent Creditor
A month later, GameTech.com realizes that it underestimated its
need for capital, so it seeks financing from another bank. During
negotiations, GameTech.com offers its most successful line of games
as collateral for the loan.
To ensure that this collateral is not encumbered, the second bank
goes to the Copyright Office Web site to conduct a search in the
relational database. The second bank either can search by party
name or by work description. In this instance, either search will
show that the proposed collateral is already subject to the security
agreement between GameTech.com and the first bank. Thus, the
second bank will be on notice that if it lends money to the company,
it will be considered an unsecured creditor in the event of a
bankruptcy proceeding or a default. Alternatively, if the second bank
lends money subject to the bank's lien, the second bank may be a
secured creditor second in line to collect any proceeds. It will not,
however, gain priority over the first bank absent any agreement
which subordinates the interests of the first bank under those of the
second bank.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever law Congress passes, participants in the commercial
world will follow. 210 Nevertheless, due to the inherent conflicts in the
current law of intellectual property secured financing, and the
importance of intellectual property in the world market, Congress must
enact legislation to address this issue.
In addition, since a loan is typically secured by a collateral
package-which may include inventory, accounts receivable,
equipment, trademarks, patents, and copyrights---parties to a secured
transaction must file as to many of these forms of property at the state
level. This essentially creates a de facto dual filing system for most
secured transactions. A purely federal system for copyrights, however,
would place perfection in copyrights under the guidance of federal law,
leaving other important functions with the UCC and the Bankruptcy
Code, including foreclosure. Such a system would avoid the conflicts
that arise from a "mixed" approach where security interests are filed at
the state level and ownership interests at the federal level. This system
would also endorse the constitutional goals pertaining to federal
intellectual property, goals that encourage developers to develop and
the public to benefit from authored works.
Ara A. Babaian*
210. Such a tenor can be heard inAvalon where the court stated:
[i]flmperial Bank had merely done what the law requires... it would
have been found to be perfected. All it had to do was determine what
its collateral consisted of, consult the law, and perfect its interest. It
failed to take those simple steps, and it is now unperfected as a result.
In re.Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 523 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
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